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ABSTRACT
Public consultations are used by regulatory agencies for input into their
decisions and provide an opportunity for interest groups to voice their
concerns. However, researchers emphasised that interest groups are also
active before consultations, when drafting regulatory rules. Public
consultations might be the tip of the iceberg, with influence during early rule
drafting stages looming beneath the surface. This paper looks into interest
group behaviour during rulemaking by the European Union Aviation Safety
Agency (EASA). Combining datasets on interest group access to rule drafting
workshops (N = 538) and interest group behaviour in consultations (N =
42,595), the paper assesses what those that help draft rules do during public
consultations. Strikingly, only a minority of these groups participate in
consultations afterwards. Those that do participate, however, make active
attempts to change regulation. These findings do not differ for different
interest group types or at different levels of salience. Public consultations are
therefore actively used by insiders, emphasising their importance for
providing input in the rulemaking process. However, as many of those that
draft rules do not participate in public consultations, the impact of many vital
interest groups exists beneath the surface.
KEYWORDS EU agency; consultation; EASA; interest groups; stakeholders; rulemaking
EU agencies develop regulatory rules to facilitate the development of EU
implementing acts and specify how broad regulations are concretely enforced
(Chiti, 2013). In establishing these rules, agencies seek outside input, often
using public consultations (Arras & Braun, 2018). Through consultations, the
agency gets crucial information that it may otherwise overlook (Klüver,
2012; Yackee, 2015). Consultations offer those with an interest in EU
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regulation an opportunity to have their concerns heard by the agency.
However, the technical nature of regulatory rules often prevents the
general public to mobilise and provide input (Culpepper, 2011; Olson,
1971). There is therefore a concern that consultations and therefore regulatory
rules are biased towards business (Arras & Braun, 2018; Beyers & Arras, 2019).
This paper builds on these insights by looking at a phase of regulatory rule-
making that is often overlooked. Before public consultations, rules are often
discussed with selected interest groups during the rule drafting phase. Rule
drafting can be defined as a phase in regulatory rulemaking before public
consultation, during which the agency interacts with interest groups to
outline a regulatory rule. Several scholars have looked at rule drafting in US
federal agencies. They find that those involved in drafting are very influential
compared to those that are involved later, during consultations (Naughton
et al., 2009; West, 2009). Looking at rule drafting could therefore uncover
important interest group behaviour for EU agencies as well.
This paper is, to the best of the author’s knowledge, the first to look at inter-
est group behaviour during EU rule drafting (although see Busuioc and Jevna-
ker (forthcoming) on stakeholder bodies’ role in rule drafting). The paper
combines data on rule drafting and consultations for a comprehensive
image of interest group activity in rulemaking and uses two theories from
interest group literature: venue shopping and resource exchange. The analysis
shows what actors with access to rule drafting do during public consultations.
The research question of this study reads;
To what extent do interest groups with access to regulatory rule drafting of EU
agencies also participate and aim to change the draft in a public consultation on
that rule?
The results show that those with access to rule drafting often limit them-
selves to this initial phase, implying that they are confident that their
impact will not be reversed during the consultation. However, when groups
that drafted a rule do participate in the public consultation, they often aim
to change the rule. This implies that these particular groups were not influen-
tial during rule drafting and try again in consultations. These results do not
differ between interest group types or at different levels of salience.
This paper uses 538 observations of rule drafting access and 42,595 responses
from the European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) to comments on con-
sultations. This paper contributes to regulatory governance literature by
showing whether and how interest groups with access to rule drafting use
public consultations. It shows how regulation is developed and who shapes it
and when they act. The study also has relevance beyond the EU. Whereas US
rulemaking is determined by the federal Administrative Procedure Act (APA)
(Yackee, 2019), EU agencies lack fixed procedures beyond small provisions in
founding documents and adopt their own approach to rulemaking (Chiti,
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2013). For the broader literature on regulatory rulemaking, this paper therefore
shows what procedures regulators adopt at their own discretion.
Furthermore, the paper contributes to interest group literature. Studies in
this literature often focus on one venue of influence, resulting in blind spots
for interest group behaviour during stages of policymaking that lack attention
(Lowery, 2013). Consultations are popular data for interest group scholars. As
stated above, however, they may not be exemplary for the whole rulemaking
process. By evaluating how interest groups use rule drafting, this article pro-
vides a broader picture of their behaviour.
Lastly, the paper contributes to EU agency literature. Recent contributions
in this area investigated EU agencies’ interaction with interest groups (Arras &
Braun, 2018; Beyers & Arras, 2019; Borrás et al., 2007; Chalmers, 2015; Pérez
Durán, 2017, 2018). This paper builds on this trend by introducing and
testing findings from the literature on US regulatory agencies in the context
of EU agencies.
Current insights on interest groups and consultations
As indicated above, there is a concern in the literature that consultations are
biased towards groups that are directly impacted by their outcome. Researchers
in the US and Europe therefore investigated which actors participate in (rule-
making) consultations. They find that business actors often participate in large
numbers (Beyers & Arras, 2019; Golden, 1998; Rasmussen & Carroll, 2014). Fur-
thermore, these actors are found to have much impact on the outcome of con-
sultations (Binderkrantz et al., 2014; Bunea, 2013; Yackee & Yackee, 2006).
However, as Naughton et al. (2009) indicated, it is important to consider the
rule drafting stage when looking at interest group behaviour during rulemak-
ing. Many see regulatory rule drafting as an internal process of agencies (West,
2005). However, in US literature, Chubb (1983) recognised interest group
involvement in rule drafting as highly prevalent. In drafting stages of regulat-
ory rulemaking, issues can be framed and added to or blocked from the regu-
latory agenda as agencies test the political waters for alternative plans
(Naughton et al., 2009; West, 2005). Interest groups are aware that they get
much done during rule drafting compared to public consultations (Crow
et al., 2016). If interest groups successfully influence the draft, they arguably
do not need to participate in consultations as their interests are already
locked-in in the draft.
Considering these insights from the US literature, it is important to see
whether similar dynamics unfold for EU agencies. To know how interest
groups aim to influence EU regulatory rules, we need to assess whether inter-
est groups limit themselves to the drafting phase or also participate and
attempt to change regulation during the consultation on the rule they
helped draft.
JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC POLICY 1679
Venue shopping and resource exchange theory
To address these gaps in the literature, two sets of hypotheses on the role of
interest groups with access to rule drafting are formulated. The first hypoth-
eses address participation in and the second attempting to change the
draft rule during public consultations after having access to rule drafting.
First, a distinction is made between access (to rule drafting) and partici-
pation (in consultations). Access happens ‘when a group has entered a political
arena passing a threshold controlled by relevant gatekeepers’ (Binderkrantz
et al., 2017, p. 307). In this case, the agency determines which interest
group passes the threshold of rule drafting groups. In (consultation) partici-
pation, interest groups are in control of being involved themselves.
Interest groups have many venues they could try to participate in, but
limited resources (Baumgartner & Leech, 2001). Venue shopping theory is
often used to explain interest groups’ choice to lobby one institution over
another, for instance the European Commission or national ministries
(Beyers & Kerremans, 2012). It is used here to explain the decision to use
different participation instruments, namely rule drafting and consultations,
from a single institution. Interest groups are assumed to participate in
venues they expect are most receptive to them (Baumgartner & Jones,
1993; Princen & Kerremans, 2008). Others indicated that venues with
limited access to opponents are favoured by interest groups (Beyers & Kerre-
mans, 2012). Interest groups can thus be expected to have their biggest
impact during the more exclusive drafting phase. After having successful
influence during rule drafting, their input is part of the draft rule before the
public consultation. Therefore, they are less inclined to participate in the
public consultation as they are satisfied with the status quo (Lowery, 2007).
It is thus expected that:
H1: Interest groups with access to rule drafting are not likely to participate in
public consultations on rules they drafted.
Some types of interest group may, however, be more influential than
others during rule drafting and therefore less inclined to participate in
public consultations. Resource exchange theory (Bouwen, 2004) is often
adopted to explain differences in lobby success. It assumes that those with
the resources an agency needs are successful in having their voices heard.
EU agencies need technical expertise and knowledge about whether rules
are politically and practically feasible to implement, but also support from
actors they regulate to pre-empt enforcement problems (Arras & Braun,
2018). Business actors often have much expertise on their sector and their
working practices (Crow et al., 2016; Klüver, 2012; Yackee, 2015). EU agencies
also pursue support from business actors at an early stage (Arras & Braun,
2018). Business actors are therefore expected to be influential during the
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drafting phase and participate less than other actors in consultations on rules
they drafted. Business associations in particular are expected to be influential.
The drafting phase allows access for few interest groups and business associ-
ations can speak for their constituency (Grömping & Halpin, 2019) whereas
individual firms presumably defend their own interests. This makes associ-
ations more likely to become insiders (Fraussen et al., 2015), such as rule draft-
ing group members. Furthermore, in the EU agency context, national
regulatory agencies have relevant expertise. National agencies implement
the rules established by EU agencies (Groenleer et al., 2010) and thus under-
stand what implementation requires. They are furthermore essential to have
on board to ease enforcement. It is therefore expected that:
H1a: Business associations and national regulators with access to rule drafting
are less likely to participate in public consultations on rules they drafted than
other interest groups with access to rule drafting.
Despite the expectations in H1(a), interest groups that drafted a rule may
still participate in consultations as the costs are very low for groups with
access to rule drafting. Consultation participating is at the interest groups’ dis-
cretion. Rule drafters already prepared positions and participating only
requires them to submit these on a consultation website. Especially for
highly salient and important rules, interest groups may ensure that issues
they failed to get into the draft rule are taken into account again. Furthermore,
interest groups may expect conflict in salient cases (Gormley, 1986; Klüver
et al., 2015) and want to maintain any influence they had. Lastly, in salient
cases, interest groups may make public statements, showing members that
they defend their interests on high profile issues (Lowery, 2007). It is therefore
expected that:
H1b: Interest groups with access to rule drafting are more likely to participate in
public consultations on rules they drafted when the salience of a rule is higher.
As rule drafting group members may participate in consultations, it is
necessary to look at what they do when they do. Participation does not
mean attempting to change the draft rule. Interest groups may also express
their agreement with the rule, which is likely if they were influential when
drafting the rule and want to defend it. The second set of hypotheses there-
fore focuses on what groups that drafted regulatory rules do during consul-
tations. Such groups would most likely attempt to change a draft rule only
if they were not influential during rule drafting and are unsatisfied with the
outcome. As interest groups are found to be influential during rule drafting
in previous US research, it is expected that:
H2: Interest groups with access to rule drafting are less likely to attempt to
change the draft rule in public consultations on rules they drafted than interest
groups without access to rule drafting.
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Similar to H1a, groups that are likely more influential than others during
rule drafting should make less attempts to change rules compared to
others. It is therefore expected that:
H2a: Business associations and national regulators with access to rule drafting
are less likely to attempt to change the draft rule in public consultations on
rules they drafted than other interest groups with access to rule drafting.
Research design
EASA as a case
Many EU agencies involve interest groups when drafting regulatory rules.
Usually the working groups (also called expert groups, committees or
working parties) that draft rules, offer interest group access. For instance,
the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) uses consultative
working groups of market participants to provide expert advice on draft
rules (ESMA, 2019) and the European Union Agency for Railways (ERA) has
interest groups as participants in their working parties (ERA Executive Director,
2018). Rather than interest groups auditing and advising working groups that
draft rules, which happens at many agencies, interest groups are members of
EASA’s working groups. EASA is advanced in formulating transparent rulemak-
ing procedures (Chiti, 2013).
EASA is an interesting case to study interest group engagement. Different
from many other EU agencies, EASA has enforcement competences (Scholten,
2017) and is highly independent from its political principals (Wonka & Rittber-
ger, 2010). These attributes motivate interest groups to actively use consul-
tations as, once finalised, EASA’s rules are difficult to overturn and are
directly enforced. Many interest groups likely participate actively in public
consultations, in particular business associations and national regulators,
which are involved in or subject to EASA enforcement. EASA is therefore a
less likely case for H1(a) and H2(a). To put this in perspective, the interest
group density of three years of ESMA (a very powerful EU agency) consul-
tations (2395 (Chalmers, 2015)) is comparable to 11 years of EASA consul-
tations (2504). EASA directly regulates airplane producers such as Boeing
and Airbus, with substantive (lobbying) resources, but also smaller suppliers
of aircraft parts and software. Furthermore, many aviation companies were
formerly state-owned, such as airports and air traffic controllers. Despite
decades of privatisation (Thelle & Sonne, 2018), many such actors have
close ties with governments. National public authorities are prevalent in
EASA’s consultations (Beyers & Arras, 2019), making H1a and H2a less likely.
Furthermore, EASA has limited environmental decision-making competences,
limiting its appeal to environmental interest groups. Most citizen groups in
EASA consultations are air sport groups seeking more lenient regulation. As
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the content of EASA’s rules is technical, citizens and citizen groups may not
have much input to raise during consultations. It is therefore more likely to
confirm H1a & H2a compared to agencies with less technical and more
broadly appealing rules.
The agency’s rules are drafted using two procedures; the ‘agency pro-
cedure’, in which the agency drafts a rule, and using rule drafting groups
made up of EASA and national agency bureaucrats and interested parties
(EASA Management Board, 2015). EASA’s executive director determines
access to rule drafting groups (EASA Management Board, 2015). Each rule
drafting group is set up for a single rule. In the 225 EASA consultations
on regulatory rules, rule drafting groups were used 88 times, about 40
per cent of the time. Drafting groups are used when the rule is complex,
controversial and in need of expertise on implementation (EASA Manage-
ment Board, 2015). They have multiple meetings spread over 3–18
months (EASA, 2019) to draft the rule. Rule drafting groups should reach
consensus and ‘resolve conflicts’ (EASA Management Board, 2015, p. 5).
The Appendix reports qualitative evidence that EASA is reluctant to
revisit such decisions during consultations, in line with the US finding
that many decisions are locked-in in the draft. After the rule drafting
group has prepared the draft, the agency’s executive director verifies it
and initiates the public consultation.
Data sources
The data for the two sets of hypotheses come from two sources and have
different numbers of observations. Dataset A is based on attendance lists of
EASA’s rule drafting groups, gathered from EASA’s website. The data span
11 years (2007–2017) and contain 538 observations of membership1 in 65
rule drafting groups. Dataset A is used to test H1(a, b) to address the issue
of whether interest groups are likely to participate in public consultations
given their access to rule drafting.
Dataset B is based on Comment Response Documents (CRDs) containing
interest group comments on consultations and EASA’s responses on these
comments. The data span 11 years of rulemaking (2007–2017) and consist
of 72,245 interest group comments on 225 consultations. All CRDs on
EASA’s website were gathered using a web scraper. The standardised struc-
ture of these documents allowed an automated search algorithm to retrieve
all observations. Not all consultations were drafted in rule drafting groups.
Furthermore, in some cases, rules span multiple sub-consultations. The
42,595 comments on the 88 (sub-)consultations2 prepared by the 65 rule
drafting groups are used to test H2(a) as these hypotheses compare interest
groups with and without access to rule drafting on their behaviour during
public consultations.
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Operationalisation
The dependent variable for H1(a, b), ‘consultation participation’, indicates
whether a drafting group member participated in the public consultation
on the rule they drafted (1) or not (0).
The dependent variable in H2(a) indicates whether a group attempted to
change the draft rule. This variable is based on the standardised EASA
responses to consultation comments. EASA states whether it adopts
suggested changes to a rule using ‘accepted’, ‘partially accepted’ or ‘not
accepted’. When a comment does not require making changes to the rule,
the agency responds with ‘noted’. This is the case, for instance, when the inter-
est group endorses the proposed rule, when EASA provides an explanation,
when the comment goes beyond the scope of the consultation or is
accounted for by existing regulation. Comments that are responded to with
noted are not attempts to change the draft rule (see Appendix for qualitative
examples). In the ‘attempt to change draft’ variable, ‘noted’ comments are
indicated with 0 and ‘accepted’, ‘partially accepted’ and ‘not accepted’
comments with 1. Importantly, this measure relies on the agency’s interpret-
ation of the comments. Interest groups could therefore have suggested a
change, but the agency may not recognise it as such. For instance, broad
requests to ‘make airplanes safer’ are not considered changes to the draft
by EASA because they lack focus on the rule. In a robustness check, 100
‘noted’ comments from rule drafting group members and non-members
were manually examined. While there is a substantial number of suggestions
to change the rule, the bias was approximately equally distributed between
these groups (see Appendix), limiting consequences for the robustness of
the findings. Importantly, the data underestimates how many attempts inter-
est groups make to change the draft. Given that results are contrary to H2 (rule
drafting group members make substantial efforts to change rules, see results)
this bias does not threaten the validity of the conclusion. Rule drafting group
members attempt to change regulatory rules, possibly more than measured
here. There are two advantages to using the agency’s responses. Manually
coding the 42,595 comments is time consuming and likely unreliable. Sec-
ondly, the comments are technical. EASA acts as a knowledgeable and rela-
tively impartial coder, overcoming the need to seek additional expertise.
Editorial comments are also not considered attempts to change the draft,
as these do not aim to substantially change a rule. A dictionary analysis ident-
ified comments and responses containing ’typo*’, ’editorial’ or ’clarif*’. These
were coded 0 in the ‘attempt to change draft’ variable regardless of the
agency’s response. When EASA provided no response to a comment, the
observation was not considered in the analysis.
The independent variable for H2(a) is rule drafting group access.
This dummy variable indicates whether interest groups that participate in a
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consultation also had access to rule drafting for that particular rule (1) or
not (0).
H1a and H2a look at interest group type. This variable was manually coded
using online resources and the codebook developed in the INTEREURO
project (Berkhout et al., 2015). Categories were merged if they were uninfor-
mative for the analysis (see Appendix). The types identified are business
association, citizen group, firm, government or related, intergovernmental
organisation, labour union, professional association, regulatory agency and
other. The consultation comments are from 1648 unique actors and 124
unique actors had access to rule drafting groups (see Appendix for counts
per group type).3
To test H1b, salience is operationalised in two ways that collectively fit its
definition: an issue ‘that affects a large number of people in a significant way’
(Gormley, 1986, p. 598) and usually sparks conflict between interest groups
(Beyers et al., 2018). Firstly, the variable ‘interest group density’ reflects the
number of participants in each consultation. This indicates how many
actors are affected by a proposed rule, similarly operationalised by Beyers
et al. (2018). The variable is mean centred and scaled. Secondly, the type of
rule indicates salience in terms of the significance and therefore its potential
for conflict and salience. All consultations in the data cover regulatory rules.
These are guidance material, acceptable means of compliance and certifi-
cation specifications. Some also cover EASA opinions to the European Com-
mission on changes to regulation. Consultations on EASA opinions on
regulation cover more significant changes to the regulatory framework than
consultations that exclusively focus on implementation requirements. Ulti-
mately, the former is assumed to have more impact on the benefits and
burdens of regulation than the latter. Therefore, regulatory changes likely
raise greater disagreement amongst interest groups and hence cause
greater conflict than implementation requirements. Consultations on
changes to regulation (1) therefore have more potential for salience than
when only regulatory rules are discussed (0).
See the Appendix for descriptive statistics of all variables.
Analysis approach
The analysis uses logistic, random intercept, fixed slope, cross classified multi-
level models. Consultation participation and rule drafting group access are
nested per rule and per interest group. Rules differ on characteristics that
affect interest group behaviour in consultation and rule drafting such as sal-
ience and complexity. Nesting at the interest group level accounts for interest
groups commenting multiple times on a consultation and for being part of
several consultations and rule drafting groups. Behaviour of the same interest
group is likely more similar than behaviour of different groups. Furthermore,
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to analyse H2(a), consultations are hierarchically nested per year to account for
between year variance. Models for H1(a, b) are not nested per year as they lack
between year variance (0–0.002 per cent, see Appendix for other ICC values).
The analysis includes several control variables. The two salience indicators
that test H1b are used as consultation level control variables for the other
hypotheses. Beyond salience, controlling for when a consultation is on an
opinion to the European Commission accounts for strategic use of consul-
tations. EASA may use interest group pressure from consultations against its
political principal. Three control variables are on the interest group level.
The first is interest group type, discussed earlier as an independent variable.
The second is whether an interest group exclusively focusses on the aviation
sector or (also) on other sectors, indicating a basic level of expertise. Due to a
lack of variance, this variable is not used for H1(a, b). The third interest group
level control variable is experience with EASA consultations. This variable
shows the proportion of consultations that an interest group participated in
and indicates their strategic knowledge on how to navigate consultations. It
also accounts for groups always participating in consultations, regardless of
their impact on the draft rule. This variable changes over time as the interest
group participates or refrains from participating in consultations. The variable
is mean centred and scaled.
Results
Participation in consultations
To address H1, the extent to which members of rule drafting groups also par-
ticipate in the consultation for the rule they drafted is assessed. Overall, 45 per
cent of groups that drafted regulatory rules took part in the consultation after-
wards (see descriptive statistics in Appendix). Three models show the differ-
ences between interest group types and levels of salience (Table 1, Models
1, 2 & 3). There are statistically significant differences between group types
at a 0.1 significance level, namely between the reference category business
association and firms and labour unions (Table 1, Model 3). Business associ-
ations are less likely to participate in consultations for rules they have
drafted than firms and labour unions. The predicted probability of participat-
ing in a consultation (Figure 1) after drafting a rule is 35 per cent for business
associations, 51 per cent for firms, 68 per cent for labour unions and 37 per
cent for regulatory agencies. These results reflect H1a, as the predicted prob-
abilities for business associations and regulatory agencies are lower than
those of many other interest group types. The confidence intervals of the pre-
dicted probabilities, however, overlap considerably. These differences are
therefore not substantial. Furthermore, the indicators of salience, interest
group density and European Commission regulation, are not significant
(Table 1, Model 3) despite expectations in H1b.
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Table 1. Models for consultation participation (1, 2, 3) and attempt to change draft (4, 5, 6). Logit estimates with (standard errors). REF = Reference
category, RGA = Rule drafting group access.
Dependent variable:
Consultation participation Attempt to change draft
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Interest group type
Business association REF REF REF REF
Citizen group 0.450 0.211 −0.131 −0.122
(0.811) (0.624) (0.166) (0.167)
Firm 0.966** 0.657* 0.159 0.178
(0.453) (0.387) (0.138) (0.139)
Government or related −0.122 −0.280 0.020 0.060
(1.027) (0.788) (0.236) (0.247)
Intergovernmental organisation 1.129 0.574 0.482 0.486
(1.253) (0.955) (0.417) (0.420)
Labour union 1.530 1.362* 0.131 0.162
(0.979) (0.751) (0.233) (0.237)
Professional association 0.869 0.657 0.079 0.102
(0.676) (0.546) (0.209) (0.210)
Regulatory agency 1.311*** 0.097 0.052 0.020
(0.473) (0.433) (0.171) (0.173)
Other −0.368*** −0.300
(0.138) (0.184)
Salience (Interest group density) 0.169 0.180 −0.067
(0.147) (0.165) (0.170)
Salience (EC regulation) 0.341 0.350 −0.124
(0.281) (0.307) (0.233)
Rule drafting group access 0.145*** 0.479*** 0.471***
(0.042) (0.149) (0.148)
Interaction effects
RGA* Business association REF REF





















Consultation participation Attempt to change draft
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(0.267) (0.267)
RGA* Firm −0.427** −0.425**
(0.172) (0.171)
RGA* Government or related 0.288 0.287
(0.303) (0.300)
RGA* Intergovernmental organisation −1.459*** −1.433***
(0.291) (0.289)
RGA * Labour union −0.352 −0.337
(0.476) (0.469)
RGA* Professional association −0.481* −0.488**
(0.248) (0.245)
RGA * Regulatory agency −0.298* −0.294*
(0.159) (0.157)
RGA * Other −13.498* −13.941
(7.889) (10.698)




Constant −1.535*** −0.918*** −0.791** 0.315** 0.381** 0.393
(0.398) (0.253) (0.386) (0.146) (0.192) (0.303)
Observations 538 538 538 42,595 42,595 42,595
Log Likelihood −335.509 −338.307 −316.197 −23,262.530 −23,215.340 −23,213.170
Akaike Inf. Crit. 691.018 686.613 658.394 46,535.070 46,472.680 46,476.340
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 733.896 708.052 714.136 46,578.370 46,654.530 46,692.830





Given these results, H1 is confirmed. H1a and H1b are both rejected, as the
results lack a substantial difference and statistical significance respectively.
Attempting to change the draft
Concerning H2, descriptive statistics show that interest groups often attempt
to change the rule in consultations after drafting it. 67 per cent of comments
made by interest groups with access to rule drafting are attempts to change
the rule. This is lower (62 per cent) for interest groups without access, opposite
to the expectation in H2.
This difference is also statistically significant. In all models (Table 1, Model 4,
5 & 6), the drafting group access variable is statistically significant and positive.
For groups without access to the rule drafting group, the predicted probability
of attempting to change the draft is estimated at 59 per cent and for groups
with access it is estimated at 70 per cent (Figure 2). This is a large difference,
but as the confidence intervals overlap considerably, it is not substantial.
The interaction effects that test H2a show negative statistically significant
interactions for citizen groups, firms, intergovernmental organisations and
professional associations. The interaction effect for regulatory agencies is
Figure 1. Predicted probability of consultation participation for interest group types,
from model 3. Error bars reflect 95 per cent confidence intervals. ba = business associ-
ation, cg = citizen group, fi = firm, gov = government or related, igo = intergovernmental
organisation, lu = labour union, pa = professional association, ra = regulatory agency.
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statistically significant, but only at a 0.1 level (Table 1, Model 6). These interest
group types were less likely to attempt to change the draft rule when they had
access to the rule drafting groups compared to the reference category,
business associations. This contradicts hypothesis H2a. The predicted prob-
abilities further illustrate this (Figure 3). As the confidence intervals overlap,
there is no substantial difference in attempting to change the draft
between interest group types when only considering those with access to
rule drafting.
Both H2 and H2a are therefore rejected as the differences were in the
opposite direction and not substantial.
Discussion
In line with H1, less than half of the interest groups that drafted regulatory
rules participate in accompanying consultations. Lacking a clear benchmark,
it is unclear whether this is a lot or a little. However, this result implies that
much influence is achieved in this initial phase as many groups do not try
to consolidate their efforts during the public consultation. This is striking as
the costs of public consultation participation are low for rule drafting group
members. Groups that limited the scope of the rule during rule drafting,
Figure 2. Predicted probability of attempting to change the draft for groups with and
without access to drafting groups, from model 6. Error bars reflect 95 per cent confidence
intervals.
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which others claimed they do (Naughton et al., 2009), may not need to partici-
pate in public consultations.
Differences between interest group types in consultation participation
after drafting rules are limited, contrary to H1a. Beyond a lack of difference
in influence during the drafting stage, this result may be due to the indepen-
dence (Wonka & Rittberger, 2010) and the enforcement powers (Scholten,
2017) of EASA. Especially groups that are subject to or are involved in enfor-
cing EASA’s regulatory rules, such as businesses and national regulators, may
still want to participate in consultations as the resulting rules are directly
enforced by EASA and are difficult to overturn. This may offset their lower like-
lihood of participation resulting from their initial influence, as was hypoth-
esised in H1a. Business associations and national regulators may therefore
still have more influence during rule drafting than other interest group
types, although the results imply otherwise.
Furthermore, the results do not support the expectation that rule drafting
group members are more likely to participate in consultations that have
higher levels of salience (H1b). Those with access to rule drafting do not
Figure 3. Predicted probability of attempting to change the draft for different group
types, only for those with drafting group access, from model 6. Error bars reflect 95
per cent confidence intervals. ba = business association, cg = citizen group, fi = firm,
gov = government or related, igo = intergovernmental organisation, lu = labour union,
pa = professional association, ra = regulatory agency.
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participate more in public consultations that attract more participants or
cover far reaching changes to regulation rather than implementation specifi-
cations. This implies that influence in rule drafting may be sufficient for inter-
est groups, even when conflict is likely. Note that the level of conflict was not
directly measured but rather two indicators of potential conflict and salience.
Importantly, these results do not imply that group type and salience do not
explain public consultation participation in general; others find otherwise
for several EU agencies (Beyers & Arras, 2019; Chalmers, 2015). These variables,
however, do not explain consultation participation specifically for those with
access to rule drafting.
Interest groups with access to rule drafting groups make more attempts to
change the draft rule compared to those without access, contradicting H2.
Judging from the predicted probabilities this difference is negligible. This
implies that many interest groups were likely not influential during rule draft-
ing and still have issues to settle once the draft was finalised. However, rather
than reiterating these issues, they may address issues for which the rule draft-
ing process is merely not the right venue. The content of their consultation
contribution might be of a different, more specific, nature than what they
address during rule drafting. However, considering that rule drafting groups
operate in consensus (EASA Management Board, 2015), it is likely that interest
groups compromise during rule drafting. Note also that less than half of the
interest groups with access to rule drafting participate in consultations.
Those that do not participate were likely influential at the expense of those
who end up reiterating their points during the consultation.
Furthermore, business associations and national regulators with draft group
access make more attempts to change the draft compared to some other inter-
est group types with access to rule drafting, contradicting H2a. These differ-
ences are not substantial. The lack of difference between interest group
types may be due to EASA’s particular competences as discussed before. Never-
theless, the results show that public consultations are a venue that insiders
value, without substantial differences between interest group types. What
they discuss may, however, have been largely decided on at an earlier stage.
The finding that business associations and national regulators with draft
group access are not less active in public consultations than others with
access to rule drafting is a reassurance for the way EU agencies deal with inter-
est group bias. Businesses are already overly represented in EU agency consul-
tations (Beyers & Arras, 2019) and have much access to rule drafting groups
(see Appendix). In rule drafting groups, EU agencies can however get more
input into draft rules from actors that find it difficult to reach them (Arras &
Braun, 2018). As the likelihood of participation in and attempting to change
the rule during consultation do not differ substantially per interest group
type, bias towards powerful actors such as business associations is not
increased through rule drafting groups. However, it is also not relieved by
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listening more to public interest groups. Importantly, as discussed before,
EASA establishes rule drafting groups with national agency bureaucrats and
interested parties that have expertise on implementation (EASA Management
Board, 2015). Looking at which group types get access to rule drafting (see
Appendix), it can be assumed that EASA considers business actors as inter-
ested parties rather than public interest groups. Although the analysis does
not imply a difference in influence during rule drafting between group
types, bias towards business may still be a relevant factor in that stage due
to a high level of business access. Considering how EASA establishes rule
drafting groups, the inclusion of interests beyond businesses and regulators
was not prioritised.
Conclusion
This research focussed on the behaviour of interest groups that drafted a rule
when that rule is up for public consultation. The results show that both rule
drafting and public consultations are heavily used by interest groups. Further-
more, most of those involved in rule drafting remain under the radar as they
often do not participate in consultations on rules they help draft despite high
levels of salience and without differences between interest group types.
However, when interest groups do participate in public consultations after
drafting a rule, they actively aim to change the draft rule. Consultations are
thus a relevant venue to influence regulatory rules, as actors that had privi-
leged access to the rulemaking process also use it. However, the fact that
draft group members attempt to change the rule in consultations, implies
that groups that do not go beyond the drafting phase may have prevented
them from having influence initially. This notion should be considered by
scholars that use rulemaking consultation data, as these data neglect the
initial impact interest groups have during rule drafting.
The rule drafting phase is something that regulatory governance literature,
interest group literature and EU agency scholars should look at further.
Specifically, the findings should be evaluated for EU agencies with less far
reaching competences and independence. Future research should also
directly assess the extent to which groups have influence during the initial
drafting phase, as the results imply they do. It is furthermore valuable to
know what interest groups pursue during rule drafting and compare that to
their comments on public consultations. What they aim for in these two
phases may not be the same. Furthermore, a qualitative analysis could give
fine-grained insights into the importance of specific actors. Lastly, the validity
of the results should be assessed for comparable sequential procedures of
establishing legislative or regulatory policy where drafts are subject to early
interest group access. Because while this study indicates that consultations
can give valuable insights on interest group conduct, it shows that by also
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looking at earlier stages, we can answer some important questions about the
role of interest groups in regulatory politics.
Notes
1. When a person represented two interests, for instance when he/she works for
Airbus, but takes part on behalf its business association, both interests were
counted. Two people representing the same actor were counted as one.
2. For this analysis, CRD 2011–16 on pilot licenses was removed. Many individual
citizens responded. Due to the many comments, all were responded to with
‘noted’. This biases the data against observing attempts to change the rule by
individuals, which never had access to rule drafting groups.
3. The data contained duplicates due to inconsistent use of interest group names.
To address this, all interest group names of the same type were compared auto-
matically. Similar names were identified using Levenshtein distance. The
threshold for similarity was 0.5. Similar names were manually merged if it con-
cerns the same actor. Afterwards, manual checks ensured that interest group
names are unique.
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